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WAITING ON THE PROMISE OF
BROWN
DERRICK A. BELL, JR.*
Black Parents Equal Educational Opportunity Committee
Delta County, Southland
Dear Friend,
We have always been concerned about good schools for our children. When the
Supreme Court said, more than twenty years ago, "it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life f he is denied the opportunity oj an educa-
tion," wejelt that the Court understood our concern. We placed our faith in the Brown
decision. There have been many changes for the better in the last two decades, but we
are still waiting for the promise of Brown to be realized in our public schools.
Several years ago, the black community in Delta County formed the Black Parents
Educational Opportunity Committee. This Committee has worked to desegregate our
schools in order to obtain the equal educational opportunity to which the Court said
our children were entitled. In 1963 the Delta County School Board was taken to court;
during the long years of litigation many favorable court rulings were obtained, but
most succeeded only in stopping school board action intended to maintain segregated
schools.
Delta County, located in a hilly area, is bisected by the scenic, but virtually non-
navigable Barrier River, as shown on the enclosed map. In the mid-1940's, when
public schools were segregated by law, the county schools were consolidated into one
school system. That system, controlled by an all-white board-selected every four years
on an at-large basis-serves the children of the roughly 5,000 white and 3,000 black
residents of the county. There are approximately 1,000 black and 2,000 white chil-
dren of public school age eligible to attend the county's two schools, each of which serves
grades one through twelve.
The district contains only two schools: JeJferson Davis School, located in Suburb-
ville, a middle-class residential area in the northwestern portion oj the county, where
most oj the white population oj the county lives; and Booker T. Bledsoe School, lo-
cated in Deltaville in the southeastern part o] the county, where most of the blacks live
-either in Deltaville itself or on small Jarms in the outlying areas. Black families in
the county earn little, but in recent years a few dozen o the more affluent blacks have
moved to Suburbville.
In 1968, five years after suit was filed to halt the assignment of all black children
to Bledsoe School and all white children to Davis School, the federal court ordered a
'freedom of choice" plan for the county. Despite harassment and economic pressures
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by certain elements of the white community, about 100 black children were enrolled
rn the Davis School under this plan. In 1972, however, the court ruled that the freedom-
of-choice plan was inadequate to disestablish the dual school system and ordered the
board to pair the two schools so that Davis would serve all students in grades one through
six while Bledsoe would serve all students in grades seven through twelve. Under this
pai frng" plan, 1,500 students would be transported across South Bridge each school
day.
There was tremendous opposition in the white community to this plan, and the
board exhausted all available judicial appeals. In September 1974, on the night be-
fore the plan was to go into effect, South Bridge--the only crossing over Barrier River
in the proximity of the two schools-was mysteriously blown up. Despite continued
requests from the black community, neither state nor federal officials have been able
to finance reconstruction of the bridge. Both have concluded that the cost, estimated
at ten million dollars, cannot be appropriated before late 1976. Even when funding
is obtained, engineers expect that because of construction difficulties, the new bridge
will not be completed until 1979.
Destruction of South Bridge did not seriously disrupt business, most of which flows
to neighboring counties. But the loss of the bridge has greatly affected the county's
school integration plans:
a. When South Bridge was destroyed, the school board petitioned the district court
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to delay the pairing plan. Attorneys Jor the plaintiffs countered with the suggestion
of implementing the plan using North Bridge, but the school board objected, claim-
ing transportation of students from one side of the county to the other by way of North
Bridge would require bus rides averaging three hours per day. (We have verified that,
for most children, the ride over rough, hilly roads would total three to four hours.)
The board suggested, and the court approved, an "emergency proximity plan'
that assigned each child to the school closest to his or her home. The board is now seek-
ing judicial approval oJ its emergency plan until South Bridge is replaced. Under the
"proximity" plan, as it operated during the 1974-75 school year, there were 1,500
white and 50 black students (all of whom reside in Suburbville) enrolled and attend-
ing Davis School. There were 950 black and 500 white students assigned to Bledsoe
School.
b. None oJ the white students assigned to Bledsoe School enrolled. Some white
families moved to the west side of Barrier River; the remainder, mostly low-income
families, placed their 500 school-age children in the new Deltaville private school,
Caucasian Children's Choice (CCC). Enrollment in CCC is limited to the descendants
of those residents who attended, or were eligible to attend, Davis School prior to 1954.
Some of us would like to desegregate or at least lessen its attractiveness to white parents
as a haven from desegregation. As far as we know, it receives no government money
or supplies.
c. Booker T. Bledsoe II, the principal oJ Bledsoe School, is the son oJ the founder
for whom the school was named. He has held this position since the school was built.
Dr. Bledsoe is not an effective educator and cares little for the concerns and needs
oJ the black community. He refuses to permit courses or even class discussion oJ black
history, civil rights, or other subjects which he Jeels will "stir up" the students. More
importantly, he resists implementing special teaching techniques needed by many black
youngsters who come from culturally different homes. Scholastic achievement scores
at Bledsoe School are low and drop-out rates are high. The Jaculties at both schools
have been desegregated by court order, but Dr. Bledsoe has hired teachers--black and
white-who reflect his antiquated and conservative approach to teaching.
d. School board members have approached leaders in the black community about
a possible 'final settlement" of the school question. Their proposal is the following:
they will appoint any qualijied person the black community designates to replace Dr.
Bledsoe, who retires at the end oJ the current school year. They promise not to limit
the new principal in his selection of teachers, curriculum, or teaching techniques and
to make extra funds available with which to implement these programs. In return,
the black community is to accept the emergency proximity pupil-assignment plan as
permanent.
The national civil rights organization which has been handling the school litiga-
tion for the plaintifls since the first suit was filed in 1963, has condemned the plan
as an "unconscionable compromise" of school integration goals. I estimate, though,
that about half of the black community Javors acceptance of this plan, providing it
is legal. We are not impressed by the way in which black children are treated at Davis
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School and schools in other counties where desegregation has taken place; we in-
creasingly wonder whether further integration efforts will benefit our children. Some
of the black residents, however, still favor busing students over North Bridge; others
are undecided.
As you can see, we are faced with serious difficulties. We hope you will soon send
us your recommendations as to the legally permissible solutions to these problems. We





The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board oj Education' was less a
promise than an opportunity. By withdrawing Constitutional approval of
segregated schools, the Court did not guarantee racially integrated schools.
Rather, the judicial acknowledgment of the social and psychological harm
done black children under the never-realized "separate but equal standard,"
provided black Americans with an opportunity to seek a non-coerced, non-
racial foundation on which to structure public school policies. Because the
Court denounced official segregation, it followed-or at the time seemed
to follow-that the Brown decision sanctioned desegregation as the remedy
to which black children were entitled.
Resistance to school desegregation was so great and some of the methods
of evasion so insidiously deceptive that civil rights proponents and, later,
courts were forced to measure compliance with desegregation court orders
by the extent to which the school system actually interspersed black and white
children in the same schools.2 Somewhere in the struggle to overcome the
fierce resistance to desegregation, 3 civil rights lawyers and others, and par-
ticularly the courts, began to equate the elimination of the dual school sys-
tem with the attainment of equal educational opportunity.
Your letter reflects the justifiable fear that these two aims are not the same.
Former NAACP General Counsel, now Federal District Judge Robert L.
Carter wrote: "[F]ew in the country, black or white, understood in 1954
that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that the real
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Read, judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board
of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 1, at 7 (1975).
3. See Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term-Foreword: The Attack on the Segregation
Cases, 70 HARv. L. REv. 83 (1956); Knowles, School Desegregation, 42 N.C.L. REv. 67 (1963);
Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment oj Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REv. 517 (1959);
Powe, The Road to Swann: Mobile County Crawls to the Bus, 51 TEx. L. REV. 505 (1973); Com-
ment, State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation: Private Schools, Pupil Placement, and Geographic
Segregation, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 354 (1959).
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sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to the mainte-
nance of white superiority. 4
Thus, the dilemma you face in Delta County does not result, as some legal
scholars would suggest, from analytical inadequacies in the Brown opinion"
or from the Court's unfortunate failure to require immediate compliance
with its mandate.6 Full implementation of Brown remains an uncertain future
prospect because of the continuing resistance of many whites who fear that
the realization of "equal educational opportunities" for blacks will mean the
loss of economic and status benefits that they and their children now enjoy
solely on the basis of race.
The essence of the advice contained in this response is that white resistance
in Delta County, and elsewhere, may be neutralized by utilizing the right to
school desegregation as a valtable lever with which to achieve community-
designated educational goals otherwise unavailable to an economically and
politically powerless minority. But this leverage should be applied in ways
other than, or in addition to, the enrollment of black children in predomi-
nantly white schools.
Conditions in Delta County require discussion of the following points:
the legal and educational inappropriateness of placing total reliance on im-
mediate integration of the Delta County schools; the considerations in-
volved in accepting the school board's settlement offer; and a reexamina-
tion of what the Brown decision has meant to blacks, including suggestions
on how to restore its waning vigor.,
TOTAL RELIANCE ON IMMEDIATE INTEGRATION
School desegregation statistics show that the Brown decision has done
much of what it was intended to do-eliminate the dual school system based
on race-and in precisely that area of the country where the Court intended
its mandate to have effect-the South.' But the impact of Brown has been
weakened, and its very existence as legal precedent endangered by the ef-
fort to apply its holding rigorously and inflexibly in large urban areas of the
country, North and South, where public schools today are more racially seg-
4. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 247 (1968).
5. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-34
(1959). See also Note: Rights Under Brown and the Associational Dilemma, in D. BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 452 (1973).
6. Compare the broad, flexible standards of compliance in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955), with the more precise judicial guidelines set out sixteen years later in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
7. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FFDERAL CIVIL RICHTIS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT
-1974: A REPORT 49-51 & nn. 116-28 (1975).
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regated than they were in 1954,8 and where the barriers to desegregation,
for all practical purposes, are virtually insurmountable.
In Delta County, geographic conditions compounded by comnmnity re-
sistance have generated school desegregation problems quite similar to those
found in large urban areas of both North and South. This is highly unusual
in rural areas where, as the Supreme Court has noted, consolidated school
systems implemented by bus transportation have enabled school adjust-
merits "more readily than [in] metropolitan areas with dense and shifting
population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic patterns."'
That the rights of black children Under the Brown decision must encom-
pass more than the entitlement to attend desegregated schools is evidenced
by the suggestion in several recent Supreme Court decisions that there are
limits to the extent to which school desegregation need be carried out. "No
fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can be established as to how far
a court can go, but it must be recognized that there are limits."" Even after
the demise of the "all deliberate speed" standard as justification for delay,i"
a plan will not necessarily be enforced under any and all circumstances. i12
For at least the following reasons, it is doubtful that the courts will re-
quire implementation of a pairing plan in Delta Count\, before South Bridge
is restored: 13
a. Busing is a limited remedy because the majority of white parents do not
perceive it as a means of obtaining a better education for their children than
8. STAFF OF SENATF SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUC. OPPORTUNITIX. 92D CONG.. 2D SESS.,
REPORT: T OWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 102-04 (Comm. Print 1972). In the
period 1968-1971. the percentage of black students in tile I I southern states attending 80 to
100 per cent minority schools was reduced ftront 78.8 per cent to 32.2 per cent: the change
in the remaining states during that time was negligible. Id. at 110-11. In many large urban
areas, racial isolation increased. "About half' the Nation's black students, 3.4 million, ate .lo-
cated in the 100 largest school districts." Id. at 114. In 1971, 73.4 per cent of them attended
80 to 100 per cent minority schools, and 59 per cent were in 95 to 100 pet cent minority schools. Id.
9. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of EdcC.. 402 U.S. 1. 14 (1971).
10. 402 U.S. at 28.
11. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Edtuc., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
12. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744, 745 (1974), despite the fact that the oinly
effective desegregation plan was a metropolitan area plan, the Court held that desegiega-
tion stops at the city limits, unless it call be shown that deliberately segregative actions %%ere
taken in the surrounding school districts contributing to the segregation of the city's schuool
system or that distiict lines were deliberately drawn oni the basis of' race. But see Newburg
Area Council v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson Counts, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (consolidated
with Haycraft v. Board of Educ. of Louisville). Similarly in Swaim, the Court indicates that even
if busing were the only tool which could produce effective desegregation in a particular school
district, it need not be utilized "when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the
health of the children or significantly impinge oi the educational process." 402 U.S. at 30-31.
13. Milliken v. Bradley. 418 U.S. 717 (1974), eliminated the possibility of federal courts
ordering the consolidation of the hypothetical Delta Count schools w\ith those in neighbor
ing counties for purposes of desegregation in the absence of proof that -the racially discrim-
inatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in alt adjacent district,
or sshere district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.' 418 U.S. at 745.
Milliken was followed b\ the Sixth Circuit which reversed a metropolitan desegregation order
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would be possible otherwise. Where school desegregation is not an issue,
the school bus has become an accepted and generally welcome component
of American public education. 4 But federal courts, aware of the resistance
to busing over long distances as a means of effecting an end to segregated
schools, have, in effect, legitimized this resistance "when the time or distance
of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly
impinge on the educational process. 15
Chief Justice Burger has indicated that he personally would stay a school
desegregation order involving average daily travel times of three hours.16
Other members of the Supreme Court have indicated that busing, and inte-
gration in general, must be balanced against its disruptive effects on public
education and "the rights and interests of children affected by a desegrega-
tion program .... ,17 And although unlike the Delta County situation, Swann
involved busing across noncontigtnous geographic school attendance zones,
the majority of the Court suggested that had there been "no history of dis-
crimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils nearest their homes."s
Lower courts have rejected plans as not "feasible" where pupils would
have been required to travel up to 2 1/2 hours a day, t 9 where the location
in United States v. Board of School Cornmrs of Indianapolis, Ind., 503 F.2d 68 (1974). Mil-
liken was distinguished, however, by that sane circuit in a case involving the possible consoli-
dation of the city of' Louisville and Jefferson County school districis. Newburg Area Council
v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (consolidated with Hay-
oraft v. Board of Edcit. of Louisville).
14. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. It's Not the Distance, It's the Niggers.
in TH GRFAI SCHooi. Bus CoN iROVERSY 322 (N. Mills ed. 1973). In 1972 HEWN estimated
that '43.5% of the total public school enrollment or 18,975,939 pupils are transported to school
daily." Id. at 324. "The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that the total
cost. including capital outlay lor pupil transportation for 1971-72 is $1.7 billion." Id. Of the
256,000 buses that travel 2.2 billion miles, id., only a small percentage were bused to achieve
school desegregation.
Judge Winter. dissenting in Thompson v. School Bd., 498 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1973), charged
that the district court had relied on expert testimony which measured the effect of busing on chil-
dcren's physical and mental health on "whether he is happy, which, in turn, depends upon whether
le is transported to a school 'of his choice or his parents' choice.' " Id. at 198.
15. Swarn v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. at 30-31 (1971). See also
Davis v. Board of School Conim'rs of Mobile Cocinty, 402 U.S. 33 (1971), requiring "every
et'fort to achieve (lie greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account
the practicalities of the situation.' Id. at 37.
16. Winston-Salern/Forsyth Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1227 n. I (1971).
17. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 247 (1973) (Pow-ell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
18. Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. at 28. Even so, the plan sub-
seciently approved by the district cotirt in Charlotte required the transportation of 46,667
students. 334 F. Supp. 623. 626-27 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
However, apropos the Delta County situation, the Fourth Circuit has rejected a desegrega-
tion plan %%,hich retained racially identifiable schools because it did not encompass transfer
of students across a river which divided the city. ledley v. School Bd. of City of Danville, 482
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973). celt. denied, 418 U.S. 1172 (1974); Gaines v. Dougherty County
Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1972).
19. Thompson v. School Bd., 498 F.2d 195, 196-97 & n. 1 (4th Cir. 1971). It should be
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of highways and railroad yards posed serious obstacles to the required trans-
portation, 20 and where the age of students to be bused "lengthy" distances
would have a "probable adverse effect upon the physical health and mental
processes of the children.
2 1
Applying the above standards to Delta County, the court's 1972 pairing
plan requiring the use of bus transportation was clearly appropriate when
ordered. 22 With the destruction of South Bridge and no more feasible means
than North Bridge available for crossing Barrier River, implementation
would require bus rides of three to four hours-substantially greater than
those in other plans which courts have refused to approve. 23
b. Violent opposition to school desegregation does not constitute a valid basis
noted, however, that this finding of infeasibility was based almost entirely on the testimony
of a pediatrician, Dr. Hogge, who testified as an expert witness on behalf of defendants and
whose testimony was confined to the effect on school children in grades kindergarten through
two. The issue relating to grades three through seven was disposed of on entirely different
grounds. Id.
20. See Thompson v. School Bd., 363 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1973). But see Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 204-05 (1973) (six lane highway not a significant barrier to integration).
21. Thompson v. School Bd., 363 F. Supp. 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 1973).
22. The continued existence of Bledsoe as a "one-race" school does not per se invalidate
the Board's proximity plan; it merely
warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in
their racial composition. Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion
from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools
that are all or predominately of one race, they have the burden of showing that such
assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory.
Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. at 26. Arguendo, then, if there is no
reasonable means by which Bledsoe can be desegregated, the burden could be assumed to have
been met.
23. For limitations on busing notwithstanding the fact that the result substantially re-
duced potential desegregation see Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489
F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477 F.2d
851 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1974); Goss v. Knoxville Bd. of Educ., 482
F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974).
In Northcross the court had three plans from which to choose. Plans one and three would
assure 100 per cent desegregation, but 80 per cent of those bused would ride 31 to 45 minutes
each way while 20 per cent (mostly elementary school students) would ride 46 to 60 minutes
each way. Plan two would only accomplish 83 per cent desegregation, but 100 per cent of
those bused would ride 31 to 45 minutes each way. The court was influenced-perhaps decisively
-by the "practical considerations set forth in Suann'" as outlined by the district court. 489
F.2d at 17.
In both Mapp and Goss the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the
district court which approved plans requiring no busing: Mapp, because of the disruptive ef-
fect on the educational program that busing would have and the substantial amounts of capital
outlay it ,%ould entail; Goss, because a unitary system alieady existed and the busing was pro-
posed in order to improve the racial mix; both, because endemic geographic concentrations
of blacks were responsible for the racial patterns of the school population.
In Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123 (M.D Ala. 1974), aff'd per
curiam, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit approved (two-to-one) a plan in which
55 per cent of the black elementary school pupils were enrolled at schools 87 per (cent or more
black, and nearly 40 per cent of the junior high school students are enrolled in schools 80
per cent or more black. District Judge Frank Johnson rejected plaintiffs' plan for greater de-
segregation. He found it was designed "for the sole purpose of attaining a strict racial balance
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for noncompliance or delay.2 4 But where, as in Delta County, violent opposi-
tion has rendered implementation very difficult, there appears to be little
by way of judicial precedent to justify a desegregation order which would
exceed the Swann standards for busing, if done in retaliation against the
violent acts which made the excessive busing necessary. Violent interference
with school desegregation orders violates the federal criminal code;25 it may
also justify civil relief.26 But future remedies provide little comfort to parents
understandably concerned about the immediate danger of having their chil-
dren transported over long stretches of country roads in a community where
fanatics are willing-in order to prevent busing-to destroy bridges with
evident impunity. Civil rights policies that limit the scope of Brown to rights
obtainable only on pain of daily fear of physical harm should no longer be
accepted without question by black parents in Delta County, or anywhere else.
c. New school construction in a location near North Bridge is an expensive
alternative to reconstructing South Bridge-which the school board will not
undertake voluntarily and which, because of the great cost involved, courts
are not likely to require. School boards have been ordered to select "the con-
struction sites of future schools so that desegregation will be enhanced."2 7
The purchase of new buses to enable the transportation of school children
has also been required, 28 even in a school system which had never before
operated a transportation system and which did not promote a dual system
by using buses.2 9 And, where the selected site would perpetuate the dual
school system,3 0 at least one court ordered a halt to new construction until
in each elementary school. . . [T]he plaintiffs' plan would be disruptive to the educational
processes and would place an excessive and unnecessarily heavy administrative burden on
the school system." 377 F. Supp. at 1129.
24. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
("the vitality of . . . constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of dis-
agreement with them").
The violent measures resorted to in the fictitious Delta County situation appear extreme;
however, there are recent reports of law enforcement officials in Boston indicating that an
alleged terrorist campaign has been initiated by a group of anti-busing activists who reportedly
plotted to destroy five to seven bridges which provide access to South Boston where the blue-
collar white community has mounted a continuing protest against school desegregation ordered
by federal courts. Boston Evening Globe, Dec. 20, 1974, at 34.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970). See also id. §§ 241-242; Hayes v. United States, 464 F.2d 1252
(5th Cir. 1972) (denying post-conviction relief to defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241
for bombing school buses used to transport black students to desegregated schools).
26. See Note: Private "'Sey- Help" EJ]orts by Whites, in D. BELl, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAw 318 (1973).
27. Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 332 F. Supp. 590, 594 (E.D. La. 1971),
aJld, 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock School Dist.,
449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971); Trahan v. Lafayette Parish School Bd., 362 F. Supp. 503 (W.D.
Li. 1973).
28. See United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 460 F.2d 1205 (5th
Cir. 1972). See also Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal School Dist., 480 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1973).
29. See Brown v. Board of Edtrc. of City of Bessemer, 464 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1972).
30. See United States v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Polk Couty, 395 F.2d 66 (5th
Cir. 1968).
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the school board took action to ameliorate the situation. Ordering construc-
tion of a new school, even in the unique Delta County situation, Would ex-
ceed judicial limits for equitable relief in school desegregation cases. 3'
d. The emergency plan adopted by the Delta County School Board after the
destruction of South Bridge will likely be approved by appellate courts even
though the effect of assigning each child to the closest school perpetuates
the dual school system. The Supreme Court has suggested that "the effect
-not the purpose or motivation of a school board's action" is the crucial de-
terminant in weighing the validity of a school desegregation plan,3 2 and, by
its decision in Green v. Connt y School Board,"3 implicitly endorsed the state-
ment that "[t]he only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional
standards is one that works. ' 3 4 But, as I've just indicated, no other, more
effective desegregation plan can meet the Court's tests of "reasonableness"
and "feasibility . ' 3 The addition of a "freedom-of-choice" provision to the
emergency plan might be sought in order to accommodate parents wishing
to voluntarily transport their children to Davis School.3 6 The school board
might even be required to provide buses for these students. 3 7 Regardless
of whether this relief is obtained, the relatively small number of black chil-
dren who chose Davis School under the pre-1972 plan suggests that no more
are likely to do so now that the distances to be traveled are so much greater
and the enthusiasm for integration in the black community is greatly diminished.
e. The private school, Causasian Children's Choice (CCC), by offering a segre-
gated sanctuary to white families wishing to avoid integrated schools, poses
31. A court might require construction of temporary classrooms at a midway point be-
tweien the two schools for special integrated classes which all students might attend on a ro-
tating basis perhaps once each week.
32. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia. 407 U.S. 451. 462 (1972).
33. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
34. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
35. Swiann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. at 31. -[A school board is] under
an obligation to exercise every reasonable effort to remedy the violation, once it [is] identified
.... .A plan that is "reasonable. feasible and workable" is within "the scope of [equitable] ree-
dial power," although in defining "the limits on remedial power of courts.... [s]ubstance. not
semantics, must govern .... '" 402 U.S. at 24 n.8. 31.
36. In Gieen v. Cout School Boaid. the Court struck clown the freedim -of-choice plan
under which the school district had operated. but in doing so, it did not condemn freedom-
of-choice plans per se.
Where a "freedom of choice" plan offers real promise of achieving a Unitary, nont-
racial system there might be t) objection to allowing it to prove itself in operation,
but where there are reasonably available other ways, such as zoning, promising
speedier and more effective conversion to a tinitary school system, "'freedom of
choice" is not acceptable.
391 U.S. at 439-41.
37. Swoon indicates. that, in order to be approsed, a nmajority-to-minority "'tansfer arrange-
nment must grant the transferring student free transportation and spatce: must 1ie made avail-
able in the school to which he desires to move." 402 U.S. at 26-27. C/. Northt ioss v. Board of
Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489 F.2cd 18 (6th (it. 1973) (approving orders reCIqit ing
the city to provide funds and necessary gasoline needed for coutit-ordeted busing).
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a serious obstacle to the elimination of the dual school system in Delta County,
and thus is an appropriate target for legal challenge. CCC's discriminatory
admissions policy is barely concealed by the ingenuous device of limiting
admission to the children of residents who attended or were eligible to attend
Davis School at a time prior to 1954 when it was segregated by law.38
Private schools, which, as "segregation academies" to which white anti-
integrationists escape, making school desegregation efforts futile, are barred
from receiving any state aid in the form of tuition grants,3 9 tax exemptions,
4t
books and other school supplies, 41 school buildings, either by purchase 42 or
lease,43 and even the exclusive use of publicly-owned facilities. 44
In addition, there is some judicial authority indicating that a post-Civil
War federal civil rights law4 5 may requiire admission of black children even to
a wholly private school, when their rejection is based solely on race.4 6 In order
to challenge CCC's policy which now offers shelter for whites who don't wish
to send their children to school with blacks, some Delta County black parents
may be willing to apply for their children to be admitted. However, litigation
to achieve this result is likely to be prolonged, as it affects the whole range
of exemptions from civil rights laws that private clubs presently enjoy. 47
38. cj. Guinn V. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wtilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
39. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Conmin, 275 F. Stipp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), (1j"d
per curam. 389 U..S. 571 (1968); Coffer v. State Educ. Finance Conm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389
(S.D. Miss. 1969): Griffin v. Slate Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969): Brown v.
South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 1968), aJJd pe curiam, 393 U.S.
222 (1968).
Earlier private school cases are cited in T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DoRSEN, POLITICAL
AND Cilit RIGHTS IN THE UNITFD STATES, 1280-82 (student ed. 1967).
40. Green v. Connolly, 330 F. Stipp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. (oit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971); Bob Jones University v. Connally. 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973), aiJ d,
416 U.S. 725 (1974); Crenshaw Counts Private School Fout ndation . Connalsy. 474 F.2d 1185
(5th Cit. 1973): of. Pitts \. Department of Revenue. 333 F. Sctpp. 662 (E.D. \\'is. 1971) (deny-
ing a state tax exemption to a segregated fi-aternal order).
41. Norwood v. Hai-rison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Graham v. Evangeline Parish School Bd.,
484 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. Wright v. Baker County Bd. of Fdttc., 501 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1972): McNeal v. Tate
CocintV School Dist.. 460 F.2d 568 (5t h Cir. 1972): Wright v. Cit of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447(5th (:i-. 1971).
43. United States \. Mississippi, 49) F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Gilmore v. City of' Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to site. he parties, give
evidence. and to the full and ecual benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
oft persons and property ts is enjoyed b while citizens.
Id.
46. Compare Gonzales v. Fair'ax-Brewster School. Inc.. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (F.D. Va. 1973).
with Rile) v. Adirondack Southern School fotr Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (hold-
ing that a private school did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 where a black applicant was denied
admission "although race was one of the |actors along with age. level of maturity. and fa.mily
background.")
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000at(e) (1970) exempts "a private (hit o other establishment not in
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Moreover, litigation intended to send black children to a school like CCC
would be difficult to justify on educational grounds. And it could backfire
as a tactic with which to undermine private schools: CCC officials might ad-
mit the few black children who applied, both as a defense against integra-
tion litigation and as a means of obtaining tax-exempt status and other gov-
ernmental benefits from which they are now excluded.
Rather than risk unintentionally assisting CCC-by having black children
apply and thereby test the school's admission policies-it may be tactically
wiser, given the limited nature of resources in the black community, to focus
efforts on improving Bledsoe School. Without government support or the
morale boost of defending against a desegregation suit, CCC may well fail on
its own, as do large numbers of private, segregated academies and schools each
year. The low income status of the parents who must finance CCC makes
failure a good possibility. Indications that Bledsoe is functioning effectively
could increase that possibility to a virtual certainty. 8
II
THE SETTLEMENT OFFER
Assuming the Delta County School Board's emergency plan is upheld until
South Bridge is replaced, the immediate question for the black community
is whether the Brown precedent offers alternative relief for the education-
ally unsatisfactory conditions in all-black Bledsoe School. An assessment of
the availability and value of such relief is necessary in order to determine
the relative merit of the settlement plan offered by the board.
If black parents in Delta County share the educational priorities of blacks
in other sections of the country, they are less concerned that Bledsoe School
remains all-black than that its academic record is poor and that the com-
munity it serves is unable to influence basic decisions concerning personnel,
curriculum, and teaching philosophy. These are the concerns that have mo-
tivated efforts by black parents to improve their children's public schools
across the country in recent times, as well as for 150 years before the Brown
decision.4"
fact open to the public.
See also Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action,
62 GEo. L.J. 1363 (1974); Note, Private Schools: A Limitation on Raialv Motivated ReJsal to Con-
tract, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 691 (1974); Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981
the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1147 (1973); Comment, Jones v. Alf'-ed H. Mayer Co. Extended
to Private Education: Gonzales v. Fairfax- Brew ster School. Inc., 122 U. PA. L. RE v. 471 (1973).
48. For reasons more fully discussed in Part Ill of this article, white opposition to school
desegregation is based, in part, on the conviction-stirengthened by the over-stated condemna-
tions of integrationists-that black schools are bad schools.
49. Bell, School Litigation Stiategies Jir the 19 7 0 's: New Phases in the Continuing Quest Ji Quality
Schools, 1970 Wise. L. REV. 257. 259-67.
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A number of approaches may be considered:
a. The "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson50 may have been
reoriented rather than overruled by Brown.5 t The evil of "separate but equal"
is less that its promise of equality was never achieved than that, as Judge J.
Skelly Wright has observed: "the doctrine itself, imposed by a white society,
unconstitutionally stigmatizes Negroes in that society." 52 The demand in
Brown that school "segregation" be replaced by "integration" may "merely
be semantic if the underlying reality of black powerlessness does not change.
' '5
If Brown was intended to renew the nation's languished commitment to blacks
made when the fourteenth amendment was adopted, then the separate-but-
equal standard may serve as a point of departure in measuring the validity
of school policies, particularly in those situations where integration is not
feasible.
Justice Douglas implies as much in a case where several factors contri-
buted to the racial isolation of a predominantly black high school. 54 Even if
the causes of racial isolation in the schools did not constitute segregation for
which the school board could be held responsible under Brown, Justice Doug-
las felt that the problem was not resolved unless the school facilities pro-
vided for blacks and whites were equal as required by the Plessy doctrine.
5
a
In other contexts, some courts have recognized that minority-group chil-
dren are entitled not only to a desegregated education, but to a school pro-
gram that is tailored to their educational needs. For example, an educational
program tailoire0 to the middle class child from an English-speaking family
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
51. In neither Brown not the immediate post-Brown decisions is the Plesys- decision itself
expressly oveirruled.
52. Wright, 7he Role oj the Supreme Court in a Dernocratic Soriety-Judicial Activism ot Re-
straint?, 54 CORNELI. L. REV. I, 18 (1968).
53. Brown. Busing and the Search Jo Equal Educational Opportunity, I J. LAw & ED. 251,
266 (1972).
54. See Gompertis v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237 (1971). See also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Stipp.
401 (1967). aJ/"d sub nor. SmIuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (1969).
55. 404 U.S. at 1240-41. The Pless -v doctrine, according to justice Douglas, might require a
plan Under which white as well as black students are required to use the inferior high school
unless inequalities in the hlack school were removed through upgrading. Id. But see Cumming
v. Richmond (ounty Bd. of' EduIC., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), where the court lejected black petitioners'
contention that the "separate hut equal" standard required the closing of a white high school
until a black high school closed by the school board was reopened. Id. at 544.
Lower courts during the Ples.s era were no more willing than the Supreme Court to degrade
the qualitx of' white schools in order to improve black schools, particularly when the board
claimed financial problems limited its ability to equalize school facilities. See Leflar & Davis,
Segegation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. Rtv. 377, 395-96 & n.67 (1954).
But it was the "separate but equal" standard that led to desegregation of graduate schools
in several pre-Bowm cases, where the aliernative, according to the Court, could never be made
"equal." Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950): McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637 (1950); Sipciel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938). Even during the "all deliberate speed era" of Brown v. Board of Educ., courts
freqcienily ordered immediate desegregation where serious inequalities in facilities existed. See,
e.g., Rogers v. Paul. 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
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has been held to deny an equal educational opportunity to children from
Spanish-speaking homes.5 6 Rejecting school board contentions that the fail-
tire to provide bilingual-bicultural programs did not constitute racially-
motivated discrimination barred by the fourteenth amendment, the district
court, noting the low achievement levels in predominantly Mexican-Ameri-
can schools, ordered the school board to reassess and enlarge its program
directed to the specialized needs of its Spanish-speaking students. 5 7 The Su-
preme Court, moreover, has reflected a similar view regarding a school sys-
tem's failure to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese
ancestry who speak no English. 58 A unanimous Court held that the refusal
to provide language instruction denied the Chinese children a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the public educational program in violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the HEW regulations.5 9 It
would seem only a short step to extend judicial recognition of the special
educational needs of Mexican and Chinese children who do not speak Eng-
lish to that of black children whose preschool contact with standard English
may be so minimal as to also constitute an educational barrier.6 0
While educationally-oriented relief is considered appropriate as part of
a court-ordered desegregation plan, there is no reason why courts should
not hold that it is absolutely essential in situations like Delta County where
desegregation is not "feasible or reasonable." Relief of this character would
56. Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N. Mex. 1972), aff'd on
other grounds (Title VI rather than fourteenth amendment), 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974);
cf. Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(1969).
57. 351 F. Supp. at 1282-83. Cf. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.
1972); Cisneros V. Cotpnts Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972); Arvizu
v. Waco Independent School Dist.. 373 F. Supp. 1264 (\W.D. Tex. 1973). rev'd ott other gorounds,
495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974); Rangel & Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in
Texas Schools, 7 HARV. Civ. RtGHTS--CIv. LiB. L. REV. 307 (1972).
58. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
59. Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes na-
tional origin-tlinority group children front effective participation in the educational
program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify
the langtage deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students.
35 Fed. Reg. 11595.
60. j. DILLARD, BLACK ENc LISH: ITs HiSTORY AND USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1972);
M. COLE. J. GAY, J. GLtcK. & D. SHARP. THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINKING:
AN EXPLORATION IN EXPERIMENTAt ANTHROPOLOGY (1971); van Geel, The Right to be Taught
Standard English: Exploring the Implications oj" Lau v. Nichols Jo Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L.
Rsv. 863 (1974).
The Supreme Court's refusal (by five-to-foui vote) to require equalization of school funding
forlmulas in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), does not
seriously impair the abilit' of black children to require educational facilities to respond to their
special needs. The concept of equalizing school funding formulas is not inherently defective,
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584. 487 P.2d 1241. 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), but such contentions
may be better raised in litigation designed to show that unequal school funding, whether in-
tadistuict or interdistrict, adversely affects the school's ability to respond effectively to its
obligation to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
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cover equalization of physical plant, teacher quality, and curriculum. But
real equality and educational effectiveness demand that public schools be
responsive and responsible to those they serve.
Courts must recognize that groups long denied participation in school
policy-making, and ill-equipped to monitor their children's educational
progress, must have at least the judicial support and protection that have
made current levels of desegregation possible. Perhaps paradoxically, sep-
arate schools which, through the implementation of alternative remedies,
first become (in the educational sense) quality schools, may stand a better
chance of eventually becoming integrated schools as well. 6t
At least one district court has recognized the necessity and possible value
of alternative remedies. 6 2 Approving a school board's authority to both es-
tablish and later disestablish a community control experiment, the court
indicated that a school system could experiment "to see how the effective-
ness of the educational structure may be improved." And therefore, it could
"not be prevented from ending one experiment and trying others, if the
action is taken in good faith, without discriminatory intent or result."f
3
b. School board representation is an important element of an equal educa-
tional opportunity. Understandably, the Delta County board's settlement
plan did not include representation of the black community on its five-per-
son school board. Furthermore, since members are elected on an "at-large"
basis, it will be quite difficult for the black community to elect a representa-
tive who will assert their special interests and needs."4 But the argument can
be made that Brown requires such representation or, at least, bars election
processes which serve as discriminatory harriers to fair representation.
The Supreme Court has required that electoral districts be apportioned
so as to equalize the value of each citizen's Vote. 65 The principles of equal
representation have also been applied to elected school trustees. 6 The Court
61. See K. CLARK, A POSSIBLE REALITY: A DESIGN FOR THE A TAINMENT OF HIGH ACADEMIC
ACHIEVEMENT FOR INNER-CITY STUDENTS (1972). This alternative remedy to integration for
past discriminatory school policies, if vigorousI enforced by the courts, might avoid the dire
situation contained in Justice Douglas' warning that the cou's irulings in Son Ano/nio Inde-
pendent School Dist. and illiken v_ Bradley, will return the problems of blacks and the societs
to the "separae hut unequal" period. 418 U.S. at 759.
62. See Oliver v. Donovan. 293 F. Supp. 958 (t.D.N.Y. 1968).
63. Id. at 972. Thus the coot t held that thec was no ciistitutional r-ight to otttiniunit
controlled schools. Unlike segregation, which was -inherently unconstitutional," and called
for the only altetrnative, desegregation, even if the court found "centralization" io he uncon-
stitutional, "decentralization is [not] the only constitutional alernative." Id. at 968. The liti-
gafion involved the black conimunity's futile effort to prevent ite ending of New York City's
Ocean Hill-Brownsville local control school experiment and illustrates that meaningful black
participation in school policy-making can result in as much white resistane-frust teache's
unions, school suppliers, and the like-as does school integration. See CONFRONTATION AT
OCEAN HILL-BR oWNSVILLE (M. Berube & M. Gittell eds. 1969).
64. See Owens v. School Comm. of Boston, 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969).
65. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
66. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
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has long recognized that at-large districts operate "to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion, and has warned that a multi-member district would be found un-
constitutional as invidiously discriminatory if it could be shown that it op-
erated "designedly or otherwise .. .under the circumstances of a particular
case .. . to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population." 68
Multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties in Texas have been
voided on a record that included proof of: a long history of official racial
discrimination in Texas, particularly in voting; specific provisions of Texas
primaries that disadvantage minority candidates; the total domination of
the Democratic Party in selecting candidates for the legislature from Dallas
County; the fact that only two blacks have been selected by the party and
elected to the legislature since reconstruction days; and the fact that the party
did not need black votes to win, and consequently did not "exhibit good-
faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the black
community.69
In Delta County no blacks have ever been elected to the school board,
and the board's long-term refusal to comply with Brown reflects an antipathy
to black concerns that justifies a legal challenge to the present election sys-
tem, either under the pending school desegregation litigation or in a sep-
arate suit. 70 The record of long-term evasion of existing law already estab-
lished in the school desegregation litigation should enable the black com-
67. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 117 (1967).
68. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
69. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67. The Court found the black community was "gen-
erally not permitted to enter into the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner."
412 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added). This decision's potential is discussed in Comment, Reapportion-
merit and Minority Politics, 6 CoiUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 107 (1974).
See also Seals v. Quarterly Counts Court of Madison County, Tenn., 496 F.2d 76 (6th Cir.
1974); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973); Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp.
363 (D.D.C. 1974); Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Moore v. Leflore
County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 361 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
70. A number of suits have been filed challenging the validity of school boards elected
on a multi-member basis. See, e.g., Calderon v. W'aco Independent School Dist., Civil No.
W-74-CA-21 (D. Iex. Apr. 16, 1974); LULAC v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist.,
Civil No. CA-74-C-95 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1974); Mendoza v. Hafley, Civil No. 74-51 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 28, 1974).
Each of these suits was filed on behalf of Chicano plaintiffs by lawyers with the Mexican-
American Legal Defense Fund. Mexican-American civil rights groups have been far more sensi-
tive than those serving blacks to the importance of giving priority to educational components
in relief sought for past discrimination in public schools. See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Municipal
Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
But black civil rights groups have not opposed such suits, either. See, e.g., Jolley v. McDon-
ough, Civil No. CA-75-812-T (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 1975), a challenge to the at-large election proce-
dure of the Boston School Committee.
[Vol. 39: No. 2
Page 341: Spring 1975] THE PROMISE OF BROWN
munity to succeed with this issue where black plaintiffs in Boston failed."'
c. Community control as an addition to desegregation, or as a substitute
when desegregation is not available, is a worthy aim and, at least within the
black community, an uncontroversial one; 72 but serious legal and political
problems are created by the suggestion that control over black schools by
black parents can serve as an alternative to the desegregation to which they
are entitled under post-Brown standards.
There are some blacks-although a minority-who reject school integra-
tion as worthless educationally and dangerous politically. 71 Others, including
many civil rights leaders, believe that Brown intended school integration, and
no other remedy is conceivable.7 4 A majority, however, probably share the
71. Owens v. School Comm. of Boston, 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969). Black plaintiffs
sought only a few weeks before a school board election and without an evidentiary hearing,
to enjoin the at-large election of a fire-person Boston School Committee. The court, in deny-
ing plaintiffs' motion, held that a school system is not constitutionally compelled to adopt a
district system in order to better the minority group's chances of securing representation of
their particular interests. Id. at 1330.
Black voters have had more success in striking down discriminatory electoral schemes
in the South where the long history of racial segregation and discrimination ease the difficulty
of meeting the heavy burden of showing that the scheme was intended to discriminate against
black voters. Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403 U.S. 124 (1971), with White v. Regester 412
U.S. 755 (1973).
Even if the at-large systein is struck down, election officials may attempt to gerrmander the
single memher districts so as to make black voters a minority in each such district. See 5 HARV.
Civ. RicGHtiS---Civ. LIB. L. REv. 472 (1970).
In districts where school boards are appointed, the principles interpreting Brown to re-
quire desegregation of school faculities, Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); United States
v. Montgomery Cotinty Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969). should be broadened to include
effective representation of minority interests on the school board. Whatexer the entitlement
of blacks to representation under general equal protection principles, cf. Mayor of Phila-
delphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iton
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cit. 1974); Ferrell v. Oklahoma. 339 F. Stipp. 73 (W.D. Okla. 1972),
this remiedy is essential where a school systein is ordered to eliminate the effects of past racial
discrimination.
72. But see, e.g.. critical comments made hy Dr. Kenneth B. Clark. originally a strong pro-
ponent of the school decentralization movement. N.Y. Times, May 8. 1972, at 1, col. 3. See also
Alherbach & Walker, Citizen Desires, Policy Outcomes, and Community Coraol, 8 URBAN AFFAIRS Q.
55, 64 (1972) (in general. hlack residents of Detroit more opposed to community control than
whites); Sussman & Speck. Community Parttictpation in Schools: T'he Boston Case. 7 URBAN ED. 341.
343 (1973) (84 per cent ofblack parents interviewed preferred traditional forms of parent involve-
ment---e.g.. PTA. talking individually with teachers).
73. At the March 1972 National Black Political Convention in Gar%, Indiana, CORE di-
rector Roy lotns authored a resolution that, as adopted, condemned both husing and school
integration as a "bankrupt, suicidal method . .. based on the false notion that black children
are unable to learn unless they are in the same setting as white children." N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1972, at 30. col. 4.
74. Typical is NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilken's comment: "We have suffered too
mans heartaches and shed too much blood in fighting the evil of racial segregation to return
. . . to the lonely and dispiriting confines of its demeaning prison.' Voices of the Elder Statesnien.
SATURDAi REtIEFW, June 21, 1969, at 70. And in 1974, NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel R.
Jones criticized the Atlanta Compromise as follows: "The Atlanta Compromise of 1973 would
have left 83 schools more than 90 percent black. It was a trade-off of pipil desegregation for ad-
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view of the well-known black educator, Dr. Benjamin E. Mays, who favors
continuing to work for school integration, but who recognizes the barrier
to this goal posed by white flight:
75
Black people niust not resign theniselves to the pessimistic view that a non-
integrated school cannot provide Black children with an excellent educa-
tional setting. Instead, Black people, while working to implement Brown,
should recognize that integration alone does not provide a quality edu-
cation, and that much of the substance of quality education can le provided
to Black children in the interim.
In at least two cases-Atlanta and Forth Worth-district courts have ap-
proved plans that gave black parents a larger measure of control over school
policy-making in exchange for less integration than would otherwise have
been ordered. In Atlanta, school litigation was protracted more than a de-
cade through innumerable court orders and several appeals.76 A group of
plaintiffs, discouraged by the prospect of achieving meaningful desegre-
gation in a district which was becoming increasingly all-black, 77 worked out
*a compromise plan with the Atlanta School Board calling for full faculty
and staff desegregation and limited pupil desegregation. 78 In exchange,
the board promised to hire a number of blacks in administrative positions,
including a black superintendent of schools. 7 9 In approving the plan, the
court was undoubtedly influenced by petitions favoring its adoption signed
by "[s]everal thousand of the plaintiff class..... However, some of the plain-
ministrative jobs. which would ha\e. if the NAACP had not taken decisive action, doomed the As-
sociation's commitment to desegregation." Jones. Brown--20 Years Latr, 81 THE CRISIS 1,52, 154
(May 1974).
75. Mays, Comment: Atlant-aLiving With Brown Twventy Years Later, 3 BLACK 1.J. 184,
191-92 (1974). On the surface. this view departs more in emphasis than principle froni NAACP
policy. A staff member of that group reports "The 1969 NAACP Annual Convention gave its
blessing t) the concept of community control with the caveat that it must aid in advancing
desegregation and quality education while fulfilling its basic ain of providing parents with
a greater voice in running their schools." Watson, The Dettoit School Challenge. 81 THF CRISIS
188, 189 (June-July 1974). But on closer inspection, it becones apparent that the NAACP
caveat swallows up the concept. Black children may or may not get a better education if they
are bused to the suburbs, but it is highly unlikely that their parents will have more than a
token input into policy decisions at the "receiving schools."
76. See Mays. supra note 75 for a review of the history 11the Atlanta school litigation.
77. In 1952 32 per cent of Atlanta's public school enrollment xw as black; bx 1974 the figure
xas more than 82 per cent. Id. at 185-86.
78. See Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The district court found that
the plan, w,,hich provided that no school Would contain less than 30 per cent blacks (or less
than 20 per cent in already integrated "stablized" schools) xxas reasonable "considering the
small percentage of' white children (21%) now r emlaining in the systeri . I... d at 1251 & n.7.
79. The court pointed out that it "could not on its own order anx hiring or firing except
on the basis of merit. . . . Only by settlement could specific jobs be designated as 'black' or
'white,' even for initial appointment." 362 F. Supp. at 1251 n.6. C. Pttorcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254
(3d Cir. 1970), approving the Newark, New lersey, school board's decision to appoint blacks
as principals over soine white applicants oi the pronotion list in order to better integrate
administrative staffs and upgrade the pulblic schools.
80. 362 F. Supp. at 1251 ri 5.
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tiffs disagreed, termed the compromise a "sell out,"8 and appealed. The
appeal was burdened by a number of procedural issues concerning the lack
of notice and the refusal of the district court to grant hearings on the com-
promise plan. This enabled the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to remand
the case to the district court without deciding the merits of the settlement
agreemen t.2
In Fort Worth, Texas, a district court approved continuance of a pre-
dominantly black high school and middle school located in a black neigh-
borhood on a finding that black parents wanted to maintain a community
school in which "the self concept of the blacks would be enhanced by giving
them an opportunity to show their pride in their race and what they could
do if given an opportunity.'"" In approving the plan which-in addition
to the regular school program-would also provide educational and voca-
tional programs for adults, the court found nothing unconstitutional about
the concept where it comes at the plaintiffs' request. As did the court in At-
lanta, this court cited no cases to support its conclusions, stating only that
"it is beyond [our] comprehension to presume that the blacks are being de-
nied equal rights with other races when they know what their rights are and
they are getting something they requested.""4
The Atlanta and Forth Worth settlement decisions are valuable as exam-
ples of arrangements deemed reasonable alternatives to full desegregation.
In each case the plan was either supported or not strongly opposed by rep-
resentative numbers of the class.
Somewhat similar issues wvere posed in Newburg Area Council v. Board oj
Education oJ jefferson County, Kentucky. , Relying on its decision in the Detroit
81. Trillin, U.S. jounal: Atanta Settlement, NEW YO RKER 101. 103 (Mar. 17. 1973).
82. Calhoun v. Cook. 487 F.2d 680 (5th Cii. 1973). Significaitdt, the Court-consisting
of two liberals on school desegregation, Wisdom and Thornberry and one conservative, Clark
-permitted the districl-court-approved settlement plan to take effc! for the 1973-74 school
year. pending further hearings on the plan. Id. at 683-84.
83. Flax v. Potts, Civil No. 4205 at 21 (N.D. Tex. Aog. 23, 1973). The cout's statements
in this unpublished opinion that Dunbar High School and Duinbtl Middle School could be
combined into the "Dunbar Complex." and that while "the schools will be desegregated," the
"maketip Of the neighborhood . . . [is stich] that the attendance will he predominately black"-
must be seen in the colext of the entire plan adopted Iy the courlt in that case which ef'fectively
desegregated more than one hundred schools in the Fort worth s\'sten. One of' the attorneys
for the plaintiff. Norman J. Chachkin, has stated that the case was ntot appealed by the plain-
tiffs in view of the success that the litigation had achieved with respect to the rest of' the school
system. Statement niade at The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation Conference,
Hilton Head Island, S.C., Atig. 20, 1974. on file at Law and Contemporay Problems office. See also
note 84 inJia.
84. Flax v. Potts, Civil No. 4205 an 21 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1973). Norman J. Chachkin, a
Legal Defense Ftind attortney, denied that plaintiffs had offered the compromise nor agreed to
it: rather. the idea originated with the school board without approval of the plaintiffs. Statement
made at The Courts. Social Science. and School Desegregation Conference, Hilton Head Island.
S.C.. Aug. 20, 1974, on file at Law and Contempoiaix Problems Office.
85. 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
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school case,"6 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had ordered the Louisville
City School District (50 percent black) and the surrounding Jefferson County
School District (4 percent black) to desegregate their schools "[b]y whatever
means the district court deems appropriate in the exercise of its equity powers
.87 , When the Supreme Court set strict standards for metropolitan de-
segregation plans in Milliken, it also remanded the Louisville case to the Sixth
Circuit 8 where the Louisville board argued: (1) that residential patterns
and not an unwillingness to desegregate have caused racial isolation in its
schools; (2) that a simple desegregation order will increase the already rapid
rate of "white flight"; and, (3) that it is willing to merge with the predomi-
nantly white Jefferson County system, but only providing it could preserve
the parental influence on policy-making and educational program that has
enabled their elementary-level children in the lower grades to read on the
national level. Forty percent of the pupils are from poverty-level families;
80 per cent of those families are black.
8 9
The Louisville system attributes its educational gains to an "innovative
superintendent" and to a program of shared decision-making power under
which each of the fifty schools has a separate board, composed of patrons
and educators, which participates in staff and curriculum selection and fi-
nancial allocation. The local boards, according to the Louisville brief, "have
been viable and their decisions responsible." 90 Community hostility toward
particular schools has been reduced. But a simple merger, it is feared, will
result in subordination of the poverty-level interests of Louisville's pupils
in favor of the predominantly middle class white interests of Jefferson Coun-
ty. Nevertheless, upon remand of the case by the Supreme Court, the Sixth
Circuit found the Louisville situation different from that in Milliken, con-
cluding that the problem in Milliken was that the remedy "was broader than
the constitutional violation" but that in this case "the situation presented is
that of two districts in the same county of the state being equally guilty in
failing to eliminate all vestiges of segregation .... ." Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit noted that the district court's order could include an interdistrict
remedy. 91
Community-control plans have not received much judicial recognition,
in part because relief of this type seldom has been sought in a school deseg-
86. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
87. Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925, 932 (1973).
88. Haycraft v. Board of Educ. of Louisville, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (consolidated
with Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County).
89. Supplemental Brief of Board of Education of Louisville at 6-9, Haycraft v. Board
of Educ. of Louisville, Civil No. 73-1408 (6th Cir. Dec. 1I. 1974).
90. Id. at 28-29.
91. Haycraft v. Board of Educ. of Louisville. 510 F.2d 1358, 1361 (6th Cir. 1974).
School Board Attorney Triplett had advised the author that the Louisville Board was will-
ing to merge unconditionally with the Jefferson County systemn but feared the educational
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regation case.9 2 However, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) has in-
tervened with somewhat similar arguments in a number of school cases.9 3 In
Swann, for example, CORE argued that integration was not the only method
of eliminating segregation in the system and that the establishment of two
nondiscriminatory and nonracially exclusive unitary school districts to re-
place the former segregated system would be an appropriate means of im-
plementing the edict of Brown. 4 Under the now-invalidated dual school
system, CORE said, one white board of education maintained control over
two school systems characterized by racial exclusivity and arbitrarily imposed
without choice or consent in a manner that: (1) stigmatized blacks, (2) ex-
cluded them from any meaningful participation in policy-making, and (3)
systematically denied them equal school resources.
9 5
Furthermore, CORE pointed out that school integration usually per-
petuates the worst aspects of segregation, Therefore, it suggested that dual
school-district lines be drawn to serve "communities of educational interest":
Each student would be permitted to attend schools in either district; each dis-
trict would elect its own school board and set its own school policy. Given these
criteria, CORE argued, there is no constitutional requirement of racial dis-
persal in these unitary systems.16 An inflexible requirement of racial disper-
sal, CORE contended, can be educationally destructive of "the desire of
local Black communities to develop their own means of achieving the con-
stitutionally mandated ends."9
At first glance, the CORE argument, ignored by the Supreme Court in
the Swann decision, would seem attractive to the majority in Milliken v. Brad-
consequences of that merger. Moreover, he reported that the Jefferson County system op-
posed merger. Telephone conversation with Mr. Henry A. Triplett, Louisville School Board
Attorney, November 22, 1974.
92. See Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) for an unsuccessful attempt
by black plaintiffs to urge that community control was an appropriate remedy for a violation
of their thirteenth and fourteenth amendment rights.
93. See, e.g., brief for CORE as Amicus Curiae, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Application for Intervention by CORE, Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F.
Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (considered by the court on an amicus basis).
94. Brief for CORE as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11-14.
97. Id. at 22. This position is also set out in CORE, A Proposal for Commiunity School Dis-
tricts, in THE GREAT SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY 311 (N. Mills ed. 1973).
CORE arguments are distinguishable from the seemingly similar positions taken by anti-
busing writers. See, e.g., Glazer, Is Busing Necessary?, 53 COMMENrARY 39 (Mar. 1972). These
writers recognize that large-scale busing and consolidation of school districts
makes impossible one kind of organization that a democratic society may wish to
choose for its schools: the kind of organization in which the schools are the expression
of a geographically defined community of small scale and regulated in accordance
with the democratically expressed views of that community.
Id. at 47. But they ignore the legal and political problems of how minority communities are
to obtain control over policy-making and budgetary processes.
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ley9 8 which rejected the metropolitan school desegregation remedy approved
by the lower courts because, among other things, such a plan would be de-
structive of the long tradition of local control and autonomy in American
public school education. 99 It would also tend to support the argument of the
circuit court judge who condemned what he considered excessive busing
required to comply with desegregation standards in Memphis "merely be-
cause a child's skin is white or black .... " and who warned that:1 0 0
[t]he elimination of neighborhood schools necessarily interferes with the
interest and participation by parents in the operation of the schools through
parent-teachers" associations, interferes with activities of children out of
school, and interferes with their privilege of association, and it deprives
then of wvalk-in schools. In can even lower the quality of education.
But it is doubtful if even these opponents of busing to achieve desegregation
would accept the CORE alternative of two, perhaps overlapping, school dis-
tricts which, in all likelihood, would be distinguishable by race. t 01
The CORE argument that racial dispersal may not be educationally sound
or legally required is not without merit and might receive more serious ju-
dicial attention if the relief sought focused more on the legitimate interest
of parental participation than on the politically threatening and constitu-
98. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
99. Id. at 741-42. Also see Justice Powell's opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in
part) in Keyes, expressing concern that large-scale or long distance transportation of students dis-
rupts public education, and ignores the practical and educational benefits achieved when children
attend community schools near home. 413 U.S. at 238-52. See also San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
On the other hand, the Milliken Court's reaffirmation of the Swann standards as the means
for remedying intradistrict, de jure segregation, 418 U.S. at 744-45, raises some question as
to the legal fate of an Atlanta-type settlement. But the question of alternative remedies was
not, unfortunately, before the Court in Milliken.
100. Judge Weick dissenting in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools,
466 F.2d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 1972). Subsequently, the court (including Judge Weick) affirmed
-in a per curtam opinion-approval of a plan for Memphis that left nineteen all-black or pre-
dominantly black schools, including some that were all-black at the inception of the litigation
in 1960. It did not affect any all-white schools. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis
City Schools, 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974).
101. The district court that approved the Atlanta compromise rejected CORE's motion to
intervene on the ground "'that the relief sought by that group [CORE] would be unconstitu-
tional, i.e.. it would recreate a dual school system." Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 682 (1973).
However, it did consider the CORE views on an amicus basis. Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp.
1249, 1250 n. 2. On appeal the Fifth Circuit ruled the denial of CORE's intervention effort
was improper at least partly because "further proceedings may have demonstrated that CORE
would be entitled to some but not all of the relief it sought in a manner that would have kept
its position from being patently unconstitutional." 487 F.2d at 683.
The Fifth Circuit has evolved a specific intervention procedure for use in school desegre-
gation cases. It requires intervenors to set out in their petitions "the precise issues . . . [they]
sought to present .... The district court could then determine whether these matters had been
previously raised and resolved and/or whether the issues . . . were currently known to the
court and parties in the initial suit. . . . If the court felt that the new group had a significant
claim which it could best represent, intervention would be allowed." Hines v. Rapides Parish
School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1973).
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tionally questionable goal of racially identifiable school districts. Neverthe-
less, there is ample evidence available which indicates that many desegre-
gation orders are destructive of precisely those elements which are essential
to the effective functioning of the educational process10 2 and that black
schools can be educationally effective.10 3 Even without a more detailed doc-
trinal argument, courts grown weary of enforcing busing orders favored
by increasingly few might be amenable to Justice Powell's exhortation that
the goal sought and often overlooked "is the best possible educational op-
portunity for all children" and that "[c]ommunities deserve the freedom
and the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this goal of quality
education, free from protracted and debilitating battles over court-ordered
student transportation."'t04
Earlier, in his concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part opinion in Keyes,
justice Powell had criticized the majority's requirement that, in order to
establish "a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design," petitioners in
a northern school desegregation case need only show "intentionally segre-
gative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system."'10 5
Instead, he argued for an affirmative equal-protection right to an integrated
education wvherever public schools are segregated to a substantial degree
and wherever school boards are substantially responsible. 10 6 Should such
a standard be adopted, proof of school board obligation would be easier to
show because Justice Powell's criteria would effectively abolish the de jure/
de facto distinction. 11 7 Even so, the Powell formula would require school
boards to take only "reasonable" steps to eliminate segregation, which would
not include requiring school authorities to undertake "widespread student
102. See notes 132-34 infra. This proof would not be offered to reverse Brown, Stell v.
Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 1963), but to broaden
the scope of relief available uldet Biown to include plans where parental involvement rather
than integration is given priority. 318 F.2d at 427-28.
103. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION. PERFORMANCE REVIEW-SCHOOL FACTORS INFLUENC-
ING READING ACHIEVEMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF Two INNER CiTY SCHOOLS (1974); G. WEBER,
INNER-CITY CHILDREN CAN BE TAUGHT 1O READ: FOUR SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS (Council for Basic
EdLuc. Occasional Paper No. 18, 1971): Me ers. Schools: Moigan's 7enitative Revolution. 2 Ctrr
6 (Nov.-I)ec. 1968); Black Schools That Iork, NEW55SW\5EiK, Jan. 1, 1973, at 47; D. BELL, sUpra
note 5, at 579-81; Fantini. Participation, Decen tralization, Community Control, and Quality Education,
71 THE TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 93 (1969).
104. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973).
105. 413 U.S. at 208.
106. 413 U.S. at 224-27.
107. 413 U.S. at 232. In a separate opinion Justice Douglas agreed with Justice Powell
on this point. 413 U.S. at 214-17.
Legal scholars have recommended abolition of these distinctions for a decade. See Dimond,
School Segregation in the North: There is But One Constitution, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CrY. LIB.
L. REV. 1 (1972); Fiss. Ra(ial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV.
1. RE V. 564 (1965); Goodman, De Facto Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis. 60
CALIF. L. REV. 275 (1972); Wright. Pusblic School Desegregation: Legal Remedies fis De Facto Seg-
regation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285 (1965).
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transportation solely for the sake of maximizing integration."108 Assuming
that he did not wish to create a basically empty right (he did recognize the
difficulty of racially balancing the larger urban areas of the country), 0 Jus-
tice Powell's approach must be read to encompass acceptance of those school
plans which recognize the residential realities and propose educationally-
viable, judicially monitored alternatives by which the equal protection right
created by pre-existent segregation may be approached even though the
integration aspect of it may not immediately be achieved.
The legal and educational value of alternative schemes has been rec-
ognized by Dr. Kenneth Clark, a committed school integrationist, who pro-
vided much of the social science data cited in the first Brown decision.110
Reviewing the patterns of institutionalized residential segregation which
characterize the nation's large metropolitan areas, Dr. Clark stated:1 "'
Given the fact that public schools, so far, reflect the racial populations
of cities, the goal of attaining high quality education through the demo-
cratic process of realistic and administratively feasible forms of desegre-
gation appears to be, at least temporarily, abandoned and is being replaced
by the need to concentrate on raising the quttality of education without re-
gard to the present racial composition of a city's public schools. This edu;-
cational imperative Mustl be met. for the present generation of students
in the public schools of our cities is not expendable. If xxe continue to fr us-
trate these students educationally, they %%,ill be, in fact, the ingredients of
the "social dynamite" which threatens the stability of our cities, out econ-
omy, and the democratic form of government. It is conceivable, also, that
a present emphasis on raising the quality of education for these children
%%-ill eventually facilitate rather than block the continued struggle for a non-
racial organization of the public schools in the United States.
Several commentators who have discussed the problem of alternative re-
medies to school integration have suggested arguments that might help close
the gap between Justice Powell's affirmative equal protection right and the
educationally sound, constitutionally cognizable and presently available remedy
urged by Dr. Clark.' " The discussions properly focus on the basic elements of
the Brown decision seen by one writer as "integration, uncoerced association,
and racially equal educational outcomes. 1 1a But. the assumption in Brown that
racial isolation causes racially different outcomes and that racial integration will
108. 413 U.S. at 240.
109. 413 U.S. at 242 n. 21.
110. 347 U.S. 483. 494 n. 11.
S11. K. CLARK, supra note 61, at 54. Significantly, Dr. Claik recognizes, albeit almost ie-
luctantly, the value of improving the reputation for cuality of -black schools" in order to
"facilitate'" his goal of tiuly integiated schools in this counti-. See also text at notes 125-27 ijoa.
112. See, e.g., Brown. Biusing and the Seaich Jbr Equal -diational Opportunity. I J. LAW &
ED. 251 (1972). Canby, "Northei a' School Segegatmon: Ilinorilt Rights to Integrate and Sep-
arate. 1971 LAW & SociAl ORDER 489; Kirp, Conim in it Con/il, Publi Poli 7, and the Limits 01
Law, 68 MICH. L.. RE'. 1355 (1970); Coni1nt. Alternative Schools /oi Mioii, itv Students: The Con-
stituition, the Civil Rights Act and the Berkeley E.,pepinient. 61 (AtLIF. L. RExv. 858 (1973).
113. Kirp, snpia note 1 12, at 1362. See also Canby, supra no 1 12, at 510-1 1.
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yield racially identical results has been refuted by social science evidence.' 14 An
alternative remedy, sought by a substantial percentage of the discriminated
class, should be judicially cognizable, particularly in those cases where integra-
tion is not "feasible." Such alternative plans would not contravene Supreme
Court strictures on freedom-of-choice plans which result in racially-identifiable
schools,' 1 5 especially if minority parents who would prefer to have their chil-
dren attend predominantly white schools are permitted to do So.i16
Judicial approval of a community control plan, as an interim alternative
to integration, does not raise the equal protection issues presented by efforts
to make community control a constitutional right.t 7 School systems which
wish to correct for racial imbalance even in the absence of a constitutional
requirement to do so,'" 8 may also adopt community-approved, interim, al-
ternative remedies.
Reviewing the integration alternatives available to Delta County's black
community, the equalization of school facilities and, possibly, school board
representation may be sought through litigation. But the school board has
offered more than equalization of facilities: it has promised to permit the
Bledsoe School parents to select their next principal and to provide that per-
son with wide authority in personnel selection, curriculum, and teaching ap-
proach. The details of this offer must be carefully drafted; they would in-
clude funding guarantees, the principal selection process, the mechanism
for ongoing parental involvement, a process for monitoring pupil perfor-
mance and teacher responsiveness, and, of course, the question of minority
representation on the school board. It is essential that all aspects of the plan
be judicially approved and supervised.
Assuming the board would agree to all these conditions-as it might in
order to avoid integration of Davis School when South Bridge is rebuilt-
the question of the constitutional validity of a permanent settlement, as in
Atlanta, would almost certainly be raised. Realization of the points set forth
114. For a summary of the findings of various studies, see Goodman, supra note 107. at
400-35 & no. 356-465.
115. Green -. Count\ School Bd., 391 U.S. 430. 439-42 (1968).
116. Kirp, supta note 112. at 1369-70.
117. Kirp, supra note 1 12. at 1374-84. But even if' the remedial nature of the alternative
to integration is ignored. here is ample basis for arguing that such abternatives meet even
a strict scrutiny standard athbough they tend to give state sanction to racially identifiable schools.
See Alternative Schools for NIinoritv Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act and the
Berkeley Experiment, supra note 1 12.
Even Proponents concede that community control does not guarantee educational quality,
and although it has been promising where tried, the experience is far ftrom problem-fi-ee.
Soe NI. ZIstsT, DEiENTRAILIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1969 DECENTRALIZATION LAW IN
NE W YoRK CrYis (1973); CONFRONiATION AT OCEAN Hiii -BiRoW'NSVILL (M. Berube & N. Gittell
eds. 1969): Cohien, Ihe Prite (!I Co rnmun iny Contiol, 48 Cos'IaN iE AR 23 (July 1969).
118. See Offet rtsann v. NitkoNwski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967). Tometz %-. Board of Educ.. 39
111. 2dt 593. 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968): Balshaugh v. Roswland. 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972);
State ex Pt. Citizens Againsl Mandators Busing v. Brooks. 80 Wash. 2d 121. 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
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above would support an argument that the settlement plan is consistent with
Brown.
These arguments will have greater impact if the board can be convinced
to incorporate a review period, of five to ten years, after which it would auto-
matically return to the courts for further consideration of the integration
remedy. In support of this arrangement, its advocates could argue that: while
Brown requires school desegregation, the courts gave whites fifteen years of
"all deliberate speed" to get ready for racially-mixed schools;11 9 most of this
time was squandered in evasive tactics that further damaged black children.
Now that desegregation has been ordered, many black parents recognize
the need for a period during which they can choose schools where the prior-
ity is overcoming the dual image that black children cannot learn and that
black schools are poor schools. Even if no educational benefit to black chil-
dren occurs during the period, the principals of Brown are not affected; so-
cial science evidence has failed to reveal any educational strategy that is cer-
tain to equalize educational outcomes. By limiting the settlement plan, blacks
also explicitly preserve their all-important right to attend schools with whites.
III
THE Brown DECISION REVISITED
Whether Delta County, or other blacks, should seek a settlement plan of
the type described will depend on many factors which are unique to each in-
dividual community; but some general considerations should assist parents
in reaching conclusions endemic to conditions in their area.
Although the Brown decision purported to give blacks the right to attend
school with whites, it actually provides blacks with the means to achieve edu-
cational equality in black schools.120 The power inherent in the right to
school desegregation has been frequently worth more than the educational
value of exercising that right. This apparent paradox conforms perfectly
with a societal pattern in which minority rights are granted or /withheld by
the majority according to which action will serve majority interests best.
Blacks were the gratuitous beneficiaries when the northern states abolished
slavery in the post-Revolutionary War period because slavery was not eco-
119. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. at 301.
120. Certainly Brown comprised associational, as well as educational, components. But
having judicially condoned the continued existence of "one-race" schools in a desegregated
school system, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 25-27; Northcross
v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
962 (1974), and seemingly having consigned substantial numbers of inner-city black students
to permanent assignment in all-black schools, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), it is
too late to argue the imperative in Brown of having black children actually attend school with
whites.
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nomically feasible and provided unwanted competition with white labor.1 2 1
Southern slavery was prohibited by issuance of the Emancipation Proclama-
tion less because it was morally reprehensible, than because such action was
compelled by the need to disrupt the Confederate work force and the de-
sire to win European support. 122 It is possible that history will show that the
Brown decision also served the interests of white Americans more than black
Americans. 123
The multiple motivations that abolished slavery did not prevent blacks from
obtaining their freedom; similarly, the progress made under Brown has been
great, despite its ambivalent origins. But, further progress in the school area
requires at least the basic recognition that there may be a distinction between
what is offered and what can be obtained.
In accomplishing this cognitive process, some basic facts must be accepted:
a. White opposition to school desegregation is increasing. This is hardly a
secret.12 4 Most whites have never been enthusiastic about sending their chil-
dren to school with more than a few blacks. The Brown decision won sym-
pathy for the plight of black children, but it did not alter the steadfast op-
position of white parents to enroll their children in predominately black
schools. For all the reasons that a racist society could muster, most black
schools were inferior to their white counterparts. But, in the course of argu-
ing the need to admit black children to white schools, integrationists painted
a far worse picture of the situation than even some pre-Brown black schools
and their products deserved.' 25 The appeals to white sympathy concerning
the plight of black children gained support for desegregation in general,
but increased the determination of white parents not to involve themselves and
their children in what was presented as the only remedy.' 2 6 As one writer put
it:
12 7
121. See A. ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVER) IN THE NORTH
(1967).
122. See J. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (1963); Dillard, The Emancipation
Proclamation on the Perspective of Time. 23 LAW IN TRANSITION 95 (1963).
123. See Steel, A Critic's View of the Warren Court Nine Men in Black Who Think 'hite, N.Y.
TiLs, Oct. 13, 1968 (Magazine), at 56.
124. Dissenting in Milliken v. Bradley, Justice Maishall expressed the fear that the Court's
refusal to affirm a metropolitan area remedy "is more a reflection of a perceived public mood
that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than
it is the product of neutral principles of law." 418 U.S. at 814.
125. See Sowell, Black Excellence--4he Case of Dunbar High School. 35 PUB. INTERESi 3 (Spring
1974).
126. In one survey, two-thirds of those questioned approved of desegregated public schools
in principle, but 69 per cent opposed busing as a means of achieving desegregation. What
the Gallup Poll Discovered About Busing. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1972, at 24. There is every reason
to believe that the opposition has increased substantially in the period since that poll was taken.
127. L. FEIN, THE ECOLOGY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN INQUIRY INTO COMMUNITY CON-
TROL 6 (1971).
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In effect, the liberal community, both black and white, was caught up
in a wrenching dilemma. The only way, it appeared, to move a sluggish
nation towards massive amelioration of the Negro condition was to show
how terrifyingly debilitating were the effects of discrimination and bigotry.
The more lurid the detail, the more guilt it would evoke, and the more
guilt, the more readiness to act. Yet the same lurid detail that did, in the
event, prompt large-scale federal programs, also reinforced white con-
victions that Negroes were undesirable objects of interaction.
The social scientists did not help matters. In an effort to prove the edu-
cational value of desegregation, studies were published which seemed to
show that black pupil performance improved when they were placed in
white schools.128 The corollary to this interpretation was: " 'when you mix
Negroes with Negroes, you get stupidity.' "129 Later studies were incon-
clusive, tending to show, according to Ronald Edmonds, Harvard's Urban
Studies Center Director, that "under court-ordered integration, some Black
pupils do better, some Black pupils do about the same and some Black pu-
pils do worse."13 Faced with such inconclusive data and, already concerned
about the enforcibility of long-distance busing orders, all but the most com-
mitted federal judges paused and almost beseechingly looked for help. 13 1
b. Integration strategies remain inflexible despite the unimpressive reports
of the educational effectiveness of integration, despite the increasing white
opposition as school integration standards designed for southern rural
areas are applied to large urban areas, and, most important of all, despite
indications that black parents in large numbers have lost faith in the basic
strategy of school desegregation litigation, i.e., to get the same quality of
education white children are receiving, you must enroll black children in
the same schools as white children.
The key to the disenchantment of black parents can be found in the de-
segregation orders themselves. In an effort to make school desegregation
128. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 29 (1966); U.S. CoMMis-
SION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
129. L. FEIN, supra note 127, at 9.
130. Edmonds, Advocating Inequity: A Critique of the Civil Rights Attorney in Class Action De-
segregation Suits, 3 BLACK L.J. 176, 177 (1974). See also Lines, Race and Learning: A Perspective
on the Research, 11 INEQUALITY IN ED. 26 (Mar. 1972).
131. In an unpublished order subsequent to Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.
1974), requiring the Boston School Committee to file a desegregation plan for 1975, Judge Gar-
rity, after setting out detailed instructions for a plan that shall provide for the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation of all grades in all parts of the city, gave all parties and other in-
terested community groups until Jan. 20, 1975, to submit to the court alternative plans to all or
any portion of the defendants' student desegregation plan.
As Professor Bickel has observed:
[C]ourts confronted with racial isolation in a school district that is doing precious
little on its own to attack its [educational] problems will order busing because there
is not much else that a court (an do that will have an impact.
Bickel, Education in a Denocracy: The Legal and Practical Problenms of School Busing, 3 HUMAN
RIGHTS 53, 59-60 (1973).
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as palatable for whites as possible, courts have permitted school boards to
close black schools, often over the vigorous protests of the black communi-
ties they served,1 3 2 and authorized "one-way" busing in which black chil-
dren do most or all of the bus riding while whites continue to attend schools
in their nieghborhoods.13 3 Black teachers and administrators, the largest
black professional class, have been decimated by the desegregation process
despite herculean efforts by civil rights attorneys to protect their jobs.'3 4
Even the percentages of black students assigned to white schools are de-
termined less by the percentage of black students in the school district than
by the number of blacks white parents will tolerate before withdrawing their
children.13
5
132. See Allen v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 434 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1970); Noi-walk CORE
v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970). Courts have said the), will refuse to ap-
prove the closing of black schools based solely on school officials' fear that whites will not
attend them. See, e.g., Bell v. West Point Municipal Separate School Dist., 446 F.2d 1362 (5th
Cir. 1971). But usually, closings are justified by school boards-and upheld by courts-where
there are "non-racial reasons" for such closings. See Ellis v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 465 F.2d
878 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973); Mins v. Duval County School Bd., 447,
F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.
1970).
133. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 483 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1973);
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970); Parris v. School Comm.
of Medford, Mass., 305 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1969).
134. The courts have developed standards for protecting the positions of black faculty
during the desegregation process, see, e.g., Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d
189 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Concordia Parish School Bd., 493 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis
v. School Dist. of Pontiac, Inc., 487 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1973); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal
Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969).
But, after desegregation is completed, a wider range of criteria supporting dismissals or
refusals to rehire are condoned by the courts. See, e.g., Thompson v. Madison County Board
of Educ., 496 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 482 F.2d 1253
(5th Cir. 1973); Pickens v. Okolona Municipal Separate School Dist., 380 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D.
Miss. 1974); George v. Davis, 365 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. La. 1973); United States v. Coffee-
ville Consolidated School Dist., 365 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
135. Professor Thomas Pettigrew of Harvard has urged a racial mixture of 30 per cent
black to 70 per cent white pupils so as to achieve a high correlation between race and socio-
economic class, thereby maximizing educational achievement. He also suggested that such
a ratio would not precipitate middle class flight. Beckett v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 308 F. Supp.
1274, 1290-91 (E.D. Va. 1969). The district court agreed and approved a plan with this balance
in some schools, but because of the high percentage of blacks in the system, 76 per cent of the
elementary students would remain in one-race schools. Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk,
434 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1970). Finding that the plan failed to establish a unitary school system,
the Fourth Circuit revetrsed and remanded to the district court. 434 F.2d at 412.
In a subsequent school case in which the Pettigrew thesis was revived, Judge Sobeloff-in
a separate concurring opinion-attacked it as -invidious.... a resurrection of the axiom of black
inferiority, . . .and no less than a return to the spirit of Dred Scott." Brunson v. Board of Trustees
of School Bd. No. 1, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970). Undeterred by the threat of white
flight, Judge Sobeloff stated that school desegregation "is not founded upon the concept
that white children are a precious resource which should be fairly apportioned .... [S]chool
segregation is forbidden simply because its perpetuation is a living insult to the black children
and immeasurably taints the education they receive." Id.
Regrettably, treating white flight (and white opposition generally) as legally irrelevant serves
the cause of logical debate better than it does the realities of actually desegregating schools.
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Sensitivity to the concern of white parents for the quality of the deseg-
regated school is, of necessity, acute. It is no surprise then that school pol-
icies regarding the use of standardized achievement test scores for assign-
ment to tracks or special classes,1 1 6 curriculum decisions, and disciplinary
policies' 3 ' seem designed to insure a high priority for the needs of white
students.'l3  If black students must go to court simply to secure the right to
See, e.g., Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Comment, 39 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. no. 1, at 150 (1975).
136. The courts have generally held that when a formerly dual, segregated school system
has just recently been, or is in the process of being, dismantled, pupil assignment by standardized
test scores is prohibited w%-hen the intended and actual result is the perpetuation of the dual
system through segregation within the system, Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d
1400 (5th Cir. 1971), within individual schools, Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 456
F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972), within the individual classrooms,
Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972), or with
each student by faculty evaluation of past grades, McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d
1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
Even When there is no overt discriminatory intent, the racial bias inherent in standardized
tests should render their use as suspect in education cases as they now are in employment
discrimination litigation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The problems are
discussed in Kagan, The I.Q. Puzzle: lWhat Ate IWe Measuring?, 14 INEQUALITY IN En. 5 (july
1973). See also Larry P. v. Riles. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af] d, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1974) (placing black students in classes for the educable mentally retarded on the basis of I.Q. test
scores); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Stipp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aJf'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (standard aptitude tests are biased against black and other low-income
students).
137. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND OF THE WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, INC.,
CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA 117-50 (1974).
In Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974), for example, the superintendent
of the Dallas school system conceded that the disproportionate number of black students
who received suspensions was because "we are a White controlled institution, institutional
racism. racism among individuals.- Id. at 1336. An expert witness for plaintiffs testified: "[i]nsti-
tItional racism exists . .. w hen the standard operating procedures of an institution are prejudiced
against, derogatory to, or unresponsive to the needs of a pairticular racial group." Id. The court
accepted this testimony, but stated that -[n]o court can decree a change in attitude, and urged
"everyone involved to accentuate the positive While at the same time eliminating the negative
effects of 'white institutional racism.' " 376 F. Supp. at 1338. The court then directed the Dallas
Independent School District (DISD) "to reviewi its present program and to put into effect an af-
firmative program aimed at materially lessening 'white institutional raisin' in tihe DISD." Id.
138. Kenneth Haskins. recalling his experience in an integrated school, said decisions
were generally made to satisfy whites as though "the purpose of integration was to benefit
the black children. and really the white commtunity was doing them a favor, by allowing this
to happen." Statement of Mr. Kenneth W. Haskins, Hearings ou Quality and Control oJ Public
Schools Be/ore the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educ. Opportunity, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 13. at
5873 (1971).
Professor Charles Hamilton describes an experience in which a white teacher of a deseg-
regated class, comprised of middle class white thildren and lower-class blacks from a public
housing Project. led a discussion Of Winter vacations, for which many of the White children
would soon be departing. According to Professor Hamilton:
The disccission ft1on1 the white students was spirited and full of exciting accounts
of flight plans, hotel reservations, Florida beahes and play areas. The black students
sat silentlv. \Vhen a visiting hlack parent, who had observed the session. spoke to the
teacher afterwxards, the teacher was quite elated over the lively discussion ad Cin-
thusiasm of the students. The paren, however, complained that that session was pre-
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participate in extracurricular activities 3 - or to terminate the use of a racially
insulting school song or cheer, 140 it is not hard to imagine the level of the
priority accorded their academic needs in all too many "integrated" classrooms.
This type of damage is precisely what Brown intended to eliminate in the
coerced segregated setting. It is a measure of the virulence of racism that
the problem still persists in some schools restructured to eliminate its effects;
the failure to recognize it further decreases the chances that thousands of
black students will experience any benefit from the Brown decision during
their school years, while increasing the very real risk that continued rigid
pressure solely for school integration will seriously erode the progress al-
ready made, not only in schools, but in other important areas of civil rights
as well.
Professor Charles Hamilton several years ago warned that "[i]t is absolutely
crucial to understand that the society cannot continue to write reports ac-
curately describing the failure of the educational institutions vis-a-vis black
people without ultimately taking into account the impact those truths will
have on black Americans." 141 But the predominant litigation strategy to-
day in school desegregation suits is to advocate "all out" integration and to
categorically oppose predominantly black schools-a philosophy which "has
brought us to the advent of metropolitan desegregation without sufficient
regard having been given to the probable instructional consequences of
such a move for those Black children most numerously affected."1 42 This
is attributable in part to the fact that those who generally handle school de-
segregation litigation do not always have the ongoing close community con-
tact with members of the class they represent which is required to ensure
continuing sensitivity to client interests. As a result, the emphasis has been
cisely the kind of insensitive education to which she felt the black students should not
be exposed. The teacher was puzzled and hurt; she saw or heard nothing wrong or
offensive in the discussion at all. The parent explained that the black children were
totally excluded because theii parents could not afford to take them on expensive
vacations. Their sense of inferiorit) was reinforced, and they were made to feel that
watching television and running the halls of the housing project during the week while
their parents worked could not match the glamour and thrills of a week's vacation
in the Florida stin. The teacher explained that she was unaware of the race of those
students who did and did not participate. This episode, to the parent, was an ex-
ample not of the admirable trait of color-blindness but of the insensitivity of the
educational system to the needs of the black children, and it was further evidence
of the dubious benefits of integration on both racial and class bases.
Hamilton, The Nationalist vs. The Integrationist, in 1IHE GREAT SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY 297,
308 (N. Mills ed. 1973).
139. LAWYERS REVIEW Com.m. To STUDY i'HE DEPTi. Or Jus'iics, A REPORT 43 & n. 81 (1972).
140. Q./ Melon v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish
School Bd.. 448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971); Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971).
141. Hamilton, Race and Education: A Seatch fr Legitimacy, 38 HARV. ED. REV. 669, 671
(1968).
142. Edotonds. supa note 130. at 179.
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on total desegregation, even when white flight is certain to void the victory
of any meaning. Generally, no consideration is given to settlement, although
such action might better serve the interests of the disadvantaged class. 1 43
For example, in the Boston School case 1 44 the court, having found the
school committee responsible for blatant and overt racial discrimination,
granted the only relief sought-racial balance-even though this required
the busing of hundreds of poor black children to blue collar white areas
where, if anything, the schools were educationally inferior to those from
which the black students came. 145 The violent response of the white Boston-
ians was indefensible, but predictable, given their conviction that black stu-
dents will deteriorate already inferior schools and their knowledge that the
well-to-do suburbs are exempt from the problems they face. 146
It is difficult not to give wholehearted support to even the most unfor-
tunate school desegregation order intended to obtain compliance with
Brown. But in Boston and in many other school systems, poor white as well
as black parents have been provided public schools that are far less than
they should be. The black parents are able to translate the inadequacies of
their schools into constitutional terms, for which remedies are available.
To insist that courts can only remedy these constitutional violations by mix-
ing black children with the most disadvantaged whites in poor schools re-
flects a poverty of innovation foreign to equity and is potentially disastrous
to hopes for an integrated society.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in trying to formulate a constitutional basis
for the contention that segregated schools were legally invalid, wrote: 147
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the [fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson wsas written. We must consider public education in the
143. Bell, supra note 49, at 278. See also Justice Harlan's dissent in NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 461-63 (1962).
144. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
145. The two white high schools to which black students were assigned under the court
order graduated a total of 865 students in the 1973 class. Only 173 (22 per cent) entered four
year colleges. The two black high schools to which white students were assigned graduated
261 students during the same period, 74 of whom (28 per cent) entered four-year colleges.
The state average is 32 per cent, and the city's two "elite" high schools (admission by tests and
grades) sent 97.7 per cent of their graduates on to four-year colleges. MASSACHUSETTS DE-
PARTNIENT OF EDUCATION, DISTRIBUTION OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (1973).
Both white high schools are overcrowded. The black schools are underutilized. South Boston
High (no black students in 1971-72) was overenrolled by 676 students. Girls High (now Rox-
bury High. with 91.7 per cent black enrollnent) was underenrolled by 532 places in the same
year. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. at 426.
146. Milliken %. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
147. Brown s. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 492-93.
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light of its full development and its present place in American life through-
out the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in
public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Similarly, black people cannot expect to find in the Brown precedent a full
and complete answer to problems that twenty years ago either did not ex-
ist in their present form or were not recognizable without the hard-earned
contemporary understanding that societal racism can disadvantage black
children as effectively (although more subtly) in integrated as in segregated
schools. With that knowledge and with the experience gained over the last
two decades, effective arguments can be made in the courts and through
the political process to gain those public school rights which the Brown de-
cision categorized as an "equal educational Opportunity." In this effort,
flexibility of approach is crucial. The principles of Plessy v. Ferguson as well
as Brown v. Board of Education can be used effectively. No approach should
be discarded, and few should be universally embraced. The guiding prin-
ciple must be that black leadership in Delta County, as elsewhere, mtst listen
carefully to what black parents want from schools for their children and
then design strategies that utilize constitutional rights and political lever-
age to achieve these educational goals.
Sincerely,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.
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